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Abstract 
Recent studies of public attitudes toward trade have converged upon one central finding: support for trade 
restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education. This has been interpreted as 
strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the classic economic treatment of the income effects 
of trade which predicts that trade openness benefits those owning factors of production with which their 
economy is relatively well endowed (those with skills in the advanced economies) while hurting others 
(low skilled workers). We re-examine the available survey data, showing that the impact of education on 
attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are 
not (even those who are retired). We also find that, while individuals with college-level educations are far 
more likely to favor trade openness than others, other types of education have no significant effects on 
attitudes, and some actually reduce the support for trade, even though they clearly contribute to skill 
acquisition. Combined, these results strongly suggest that the effects of education on individual trade 
preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills. We suggest that 
exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individuals plays a key role in 
shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization. This is not to say that distributional issues are not 
important in shaping attitudes toward trade – just that they are not clearly manifest in the simple, broad 
association between education levels and support for free trade.  
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 I.  Introduction 
A growing body of scholarly research has examined survey data on attitudes toward trade 
among voters, focusing on individual determinants of protectionist sentiments. These studies have 
converged upon one central finding: fears about the distributional effects of trade openness 
among less-educated, blue-collar workers lie at the heart of much of the backlash against 
globalization in the United States and other advanced economies. Support for new trade 
restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education (e.g., Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002). These findings 
are interpreted as strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the classic economic 
treatment of the income effects of trade which predicts that trade openness benefits those owning 
factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (those with high skill 
levels in the advanced economies) while hurting others (low skilled and unskilled workers). 
However, the positive relationship between education and support for trade liberalization 
might also – and perhaps primarily – reflect the facts that more educated respondents tend to be 
more exposed to economic ideas about the overall efficiency gains for the national economy 
associated with greater trade openness, and tend to be less prone to nationalist and anti-foreigner 
sentiments often linked with protectionism (see Bauer, Poole, and Dexter 1972, 103; Holsti 1996, 
87---88). Studies have shown that measures of economic knowledge are strongly associated with 
education levels among individuals, and exposure to economics at the college level has especially 
powerful effects (e.g., Saunders 1980; Gleason and van Scyoc 1995). And a large body of 
research shows that increased education – and especially college education – tends to socialize 
students to have more tolerant, cosmopolitan views of the world (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, 475--
-481; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, 155---6). It thus seems quite possible that differences of 
opinion among more and less-educated voters over the trade issue may be shaped less by Stolper-
Samuelson style calculations about the expected distributional effects of trade than by competing 
ideational and cultural perspectives – that is, education may be important here primarily because 
  2it teaches students to think about trade and globalization in different ways and/or to evaluate it 
according to a different set of values.  
Which of these very different interpretations is more correct? The answer to this question 
is critical to our understanding of the political economy of trade and the nature of the political 
disagreements over globalization now taking place. Here we re-examine the available survey data 
on individual attitudes toward trade, conducting a simple test of the effects of education on 
support for trade that distinguishes clearly between the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation of this 
relationship and alternative ideational and cultural accounts. We find that the impact of education 
on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents currently in the active labor force 
and among those who are not (even those who are retired). That the effects of education on trade 
policy preferences are not mediated by whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the 
employment of their skills strongly suggests that it is not primarily a product of distributional 
concerns. The analysis also reveals clear non-linearities in the relationship between education and 
trade preferences: while individuals who have been exposed to college or university education are 
far more likely to favor trade openness than those who have not, other types of educational 
attainment have no significant effects on attitudes and some even reduce the likelihood that 
individuals support trade even though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition. These findings 
indicate that the particular ideational and/or cultural effects associated with college education, 
and not the gradual accumulation of skills, are critical in shaping individual attitudes toward 
trade. 
We conclude that the impact of education on how voters’ think about trade and 
globalization has more to do with exposure to economic ideas and information about the 
aggregate and varied effects of these economic phenomena, than it does with individual 
calculations about how trade affects personal income or job security. This is not to say that the 
latter types of calculations are not important in shaping individuals’ views of trade – just that they 
are not being manifest in the simple association between education and support for trade 
  3openness. As we discuss in the concluding section, we think it is likely that concerns about the 
effects of trade on personal income and job security might actually hinge on the particular impact 
of trade openness in specific industries. One of the key implications of our findings is that future 
empirical tests of the determinants of individual trade preferences need to be substantially refined 
to identify the impact of distributional concerns on attitudes towards trade and globalization and 
distinguish these from the impact of ideational and cultural factors. 
II.  Explaining Attitudes Toward International Trade 
To date, the analysis of survey data aimed at revealing the determinants of individual 
attitudes toward trade has focused predominantly on occupational differences among respondents. 
A principal aim has been to test standard economic models that describe the income effects of 
trade for different individuals as a function of the types of productive inputs they own. Examining 
data from recent NES surveys in the United States, Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b) 
emphasized the importance of respondents’ “human capital” or skills (measured principally by 
years of education), finding that individuals with lower skills were more likely to support 
restrictions on imports than those with higher skills. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O’Rourke and 
Sinnott (2002) came to similar conclusions after examining the data from the 1995 ISSP survey: 
again skill levels, measured either by years of education (Mayda and Rodrik) or occupational 
categories (O’Rourke and Sinnott), were found to have large effects on attitudes, with lower 
skilled individuals being the most protectionist in outlook.
1 In terms of economic theory, these 
findings have been interpreted as providing strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
(1941), which predicts that trade raises real incomes for those who own factors with which the 
                                                      
1 Similar types of findings are reported by Balistreri (1997) and Beaulieu (2002), who examined data on 
support for the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement in Canada, by Gabel (1998), who used Eurobarometer 
data on attitudes toward European integration, and by Baker (2003) using similar survey data on attitudes 
toward trade in Latin American nations. 
  4economy is relatively well endowed (i.e., labor skills in the developed economies), while 
disadvantaging owners of other factors (unskilled or low skilled labor).
2 Scheve and Slaughter 
highlight as a “key finding” of their study the conclusion that “the preferences about trade and 
immigration policy align strongly with labor market skills “(2001b, 9). Mayda and Rodrik report 
that the results from their analysis of the importance of educational attainment in shaping views 
about trade are “strikingly supportive of the implications of the factor-endowments model and of 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem” (2005, 1409).  
Yet there are other, very plausible, ways to interpret the positive relationship between the 
education levels of surveyed individuals and their support for trade openness. It seems 
particularly limiting to consider education only as a measure of workers’ skill levels, relevant 
only in the way it affects the expected income effects of trade for each individual. Education may 
be relevant here for other reasons – other causal mechanisms may be generating the observed 
association between education levels and pro-trade attitudes. We think there are two likely 
candidates: an ideational mechanism that hinges on the role played by economic ideas and 
knowledge in the formation of economic policy preferences; and a cultural mechanism that 
relates commitments to key values, such as tolerance and cosmopolitanism, to attitudes toward 
foreign policy issues. 
The ideational argument is fairly straightforward. Highly educated respondents are likely 
to think about international trade in very different ways compared to less-educated counterparts, 
using a more sophisticated set of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships and more information 
                                                      
2 This theorem has been used extensively in the analysis of trade politics; see Rogowski 1989; Hiscox 
2002.  
  5about the effects of trade for themselves and for others.
3 College-educated individuals, in 
particular, are likely to be far more informed than others about the aggregate efficiency gains 
associated with expanded trade, especially if they have had any contact at all with economics 
courses and with the theory of comparative advantage. While there is a firm consensus among 
economists on the virtues of trade openness, the counterintuitive loveliness of the law of 
comparative advantage makes it much more difficult to convey the case for trade outside the 
college classroom (see Krugman 1993). Studies of economic “literacy” among the public have 
shown that general measures of economic knowledge are strongly associated with education 
levels among individuals, and college education in particular (e.g., Saunders 1980; Gleason and 
van Scyoc 1995). Exposure to at least one college-level economics course is an especially 
powerful predictor of economic knowledge. And critically, related studies show that higher levels 
of economic knowledge among surveyed individuals have large positive effects on support for 
free trade (see Walstad 1997; Walstad and Rebeck 2002).
4  
  This type of ideational argument does have precedents in both the international political 
economy and broader international relations literatures. Ideas, viewed as beliefs about cause-and-
effect relationships, have been assigned key roles in accounts of policymaking in a variety of 
                                                      
3 Among scholars who have examined surveys of public attitudes toward trade, the topic is typically 
regarded as a complex issue about which most survey respondents have very low levels of information; see 
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972, 81---84; Destler 1995, 180; Pryor 2002.  
4 Walstad and Rebeck (2002) make the larger point that scholarly analysis of public opinion on economic 
issues makes the erroneous implicit assumption that survey respondents are undifferentiated in terms of 
their economic knowledge. In fact, individuals differ dramatically in their levels of economic knowledge, 
as measured by their scores on a set of test questions covering basic economic concepts and facts, and such 
knowledge scores are significant predictors of attitudes about a range of economic policy issues. 
  6areas, including international cooperation on environmental issues and arms control.
5 On the 
trade issue specifically, scholars have linked the removal of mercantilist restrictions on trade in 
Europe in the nineteenth century to the ideas of Smith and Ricardo and the birth of classical trade 
theory (see Kindleberger 1975; Bhagwati 1988). And the multilateral trade liberalization pursued 
among western nations after 1945 has been connected to neoclassical economic theories and the 
spread of Keynesian ideas in particular (see Ruggie 1983; Goldstein 1988).
6 These types of 
accounts have traditionally focused on the importance of particular ideas among policymakers, 
and the transmission of ideas to government officials via transnational networks of experts and 
activists (e.g., Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Examining the distribution of economic ideas 
among voters, and how this might be connected to policy preferences, might be an interesting and 
important extension. 
Another plausible explanation for the relationship between education and attitudes toward 
trade focuses on differences in cultural values: highly educated individuals are less prone than 
others to nationalist and anti-foreigner sentiments that are often linked with protectionism in 
political debates. There is a large scholarly literature showing that education, at least in the 
United States, tends to socialize students to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world 
(e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, 475---481; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, 155---6; McClosky and 
Brill 1983). Education can foster tolerance, not just by increasing students’ knowledge of foreign 
cultures and raising levels of critical thinking, but also by generating more diverse and 
cosmopolitan social networks, especially at the college level (see Case et al. 1989; Allport 1954). 
Indeed, Betts (1988) has argued that one aspect of class identity that emerges among the college 
                                                      
5 For a general discussion, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993; on environmental negotiations, see Haas 1992; 
on arms control, see Adler 1992 and Price 1998.  
6 See also Hall (1989) for essays on the particular impact of Keynesian macroeconomic theory among 
policymakers in the 1930s and 1940s. 
  7educated in western nations is a commitment to cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse 
cultures. And studies of survey data show that various measures of nationalism and national pride 
are significant predictors of support for trade protection (see Mayda and Rodrik 2005, 1414---6; 
O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002, 173).
7  
This type of argument resonates with a growing body of research in international 
relations that focuses on the importance of cultural values and conceptions of identity and how 
they shape the interests pursued by policymakers in international affairs – in areas including 
military strategy, humanitarian intervention, and support for human rights.
8 It is more difficult to 
find cultural accounts of trade politics or policymaking, specifically, in the political economy 
literature, though references to the popular appeal of protectionism when linked with nationalism 
and xenophobia are common (e.g., Bauer, Poole, and Dexter 1972, 103).  
How then should we interpret the observed connection between education and support for 
trade? Besides the standard account, which focuses on Stolper-Samuelson style distributional 
concerns, alternative accounts that stress the importance of economic ideas and related values 
also seem highly plausible. We suggest a very simple test to establish whether the education 
connection is primarily reflecting concerns about the effects of trade on respondents’ personal 
incomes, or whether it is a manifestation of broader differences in ideas and/or values among 
surveyed individuals. We examine the impact of education levels on attitudes toward trade among 
respondents currently in the active labor force and among those who are not. If the Stolper-
Samuelson interpretation of the education effect is accurate, this effect should be contingent on 
whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the employment of their skills in the labor 
                                                      
7 On these points, see also Holsti 1996, 87---88.  
8 For general discussions, see Wendt 1999, Ruggie 1998, and Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. For studies of 
strategy, see Katzenstein 1996; on human rights, see Sikkink 1993. 
  8market.
9  
III. The Effects of Education on Trade Preferences 
Our new empirical tests draw from two key sources of data on individual trade 
preferences: the U.S. National Election Studies (NES) and the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). These are the same datasets employed by the two most prominent studies of 
individual attitudes toward trade in recent years: the analyses by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 
2001b) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005). In the following section we briefly describe each dataset 
and present the results for our split-sample tests. 
A. Tests Using the NES Data 
The NES surveys are fielded in the United States around the time of presidential elections 
and designed to gather data on Americans' social backgrounds, political predispositions, opinions 
on questions of public policy, and participation in political life.
10 In 1992, for the first time, the 
NES included a question that asked respondents about their attitudes toward international trade. 
The question was the following: 
Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect 
American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt 
American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven’t you 
thought much about this? 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) used responses to this question from the 1992 NES survey as their 
measure of individual trade policy preferences. We have replicated their approach here in order to 
conduct the split-sample test, while also examining data from the 1996 NES survey that included 
                                                      
9 Similar split-sample tests have been used in studies of anti-immigrant sentiments to help discern whether 
greater opposition to immigration among less educated survey respondents (compared with more educated 
counterparts) reflects different degrees of concern about having to compete with immigrants in the job 
market: see Scheve and Slaughter 2001c; Mayda 2004; also Hainmueller and Hiscox 2004. 
10 For details, see Miller et al. 1992; Rosenstone 1996. See also: http://www.umich.edu/~nes/  
  9the same trade question – and which is also examined by Scheve and Slaughter (2001b). We 
created the dichotomous dependent variable trade opinion, coded as 1 for responses that favored 
protection (“new limits on foreign imports”) and zero for those opposed. The “haven’t thought 
much about this” answers are coded as missing, as in the Scheve and Slaughter analysis. 
  The principal measure of education is schooling, which simply records the years of full-
time education completed by each respondent (a cap is set by the NES at 17 years). This is the 
measure employed by Scheve and Slaughter. To allow for nonlinear education effects, we have 
also constructed a set of dummy variables indicating each respondent’s highest level of 
educational attainment: junior high (1=8 years of schooling; 0=otherwise); high school (1=high 
school degree; 0=otherwise); higher education (1=some years of post high school education, 
including junior or community college; 0=otherwise); college (1=4-year bachelor’s degree; 
0=otherwise); and graduate (1=postgraduate degree; 0=otherwise).
11 Assuming that education 
has linear effects on trade preferences seems appropriate if one assumes that each additional year 
education (of any type) improves an individual’s skills (and changes his or her attitudes) by a 
roughly constant amount. It is less appropriate if education has other, nonlinear types of effects 
associated with the ideas and information individuals possess about the way the economy works 
or the kinds of values and preferences they develop – as noted above, college education appears 
to play an overwhelming role in terms of its impact on ideas and cultural values among 
individuals. 
For different sub-samples of respondents, we estimated binary probit models using trade 
opinion as the dependent variable, testing for the effects of schooling or the different education 
dummy variables while controlling for a variety of other individual characteristics that might 
                                                      
11 Note that there are too few respondents who failed to finish elementary school to allow us to estimate the 
separate effect of elementary level education here: the excluded category in our analysis of education 
effects when using these dummy variables is all those with less than 8 years of schooling. 
  10plausibly affect trade preferences. We estimated each model with two sets of covariates: a limited 
set of standard socio-demographic controls (age, in years, gender, and race), which preserved the 
maximum number of observations across the sub-samples; and a more extensive set of controls 
(the standard controls plus indicators of union membership, party identification, and ideology), 
which closely matched the more extensive specifications used by Scheve and Slaughter.
12 (See 
the appendix for a description of all variables used along with summary statistics). 
                                                      
12 We have used age in years, since this is the most straightforward approach and is the measure provided 
in the NES data; Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) instead included a range of dummy variables covering 
separate age brackets. We have re-estimated all our results using the respective age dummies and the results 
are virtually identical. We have also used dummy variables for multiple racial categories here, while 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) appear to have used a single race dummy variable. Again, the results are 
almost identical regardless of how the race variable is entered in the models. The main variables we 
exclude are the ones constructed by Scheve and Slaughter using non-NES data: sector net export share, 
(net exports as a share of output for the industry in which the respondent is employed), and sector tariff 
(customs duties as a share of the total value of imports for the industry in which the respondent is 
employed). Neither of these variables have significant effects on trade preferences, according to the results 
reported by Scheve and Slaughter (2001b, 59-60), and their inclusion in the estimations makes no 
difference at all to the estimated effects of education on trade opinion. We also excluded the other variables 
Scheve and Slaughter derive from non-NES data – the measure of occupation wage (the national average 
weekly wage for the respondent’s occupation, which they use as an alternative to years of education as an 
indicator of skill level), and measures of county exposure to trade liberalization (the shares of total 
employment in the respondent’s home county accounted for by industries with above average tariffs or net 
imports). Scheve and Slaughter find that county exposure, when interacted with a dichotomous indicator of 
home ownership, does have a significant negative impact on support for trade openness, but the inclusion 
of these added controls in their models has a minuscule and statistically insignificant effect on the 
estimated impact of education on trade preferences (2001a, 285; 2001b, 64), so we have not attempted to 
replicate the construction of these added controls here. Note that, since there is very little missing data for 
  11We expect the measures of education to be negatively associated with support for trade 
protection (as measured by trade opinion), either because highly skilled individuals expect trade 
to increase their real wages and poorly skilled respondents expect trade to decrease their real 
wages (a la Stolper-Samuelson), because more educated respondents know more about the overall 
economic benefits associated with trade openness, and/or because the more educated are less 
likely to nurture anti-foreigner sentiments. If this link between education and individual attitudes 
toward trade is primarily due to expectations about wages, however, the results from our 
estimations of trade preferences among respondents not actively engaged in the labor market 
should differ substantially when compared with those from our estimations of preferences among 
respondents who are currently employed. To test for this difference, we created sub-samples of 
the full NES survey sample, separating those who were in paid work from those not in paid 
work.
13 Since those not currently in paid work include a varied set of individuals, such as those 
that are unemployed, students, and homemakers (and may be seeking paid work or plan to seek to 
                                                                                                                                                              
variables measured in the NES (the schooling measure has only 6% of observations missing in 1992, and 
0% missing in 1996), and there is less missing data for all the other variables), we do not have to resort to 
imputation of missing data – Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 278) report having to impute up to 73.4% of the 
observations for other (non-NES) variables they included in their analysis. 
13 The sub-samples are determined by answers to a NES question asking respondents about their current 
employment status. Answer choices included: Working now, temporarily laid-off, unemployed, retired, 
student, homemaker, and permanently disabled. Our currently (not) in paid work sub-sample includes those 
that (did not) answered “in work now”. Those with missing employment status are coded as missing. We 
also include those very few retired/students/disabled/ homemakers who also indicated that they are 
“currently working more than 20 hours per week” in our currently-in-paid-work sub-sample. When the 
latter are excluded from the currently-in-paid sub-sample, the magnitudes of the schooling effect become, if 
anything, more similar across the in- and out-of-paid-work sub-samples than in the results we show here. 
Full results of these robustness tests are available upon request. 
  12work soon), we have also isolated one particular group – those individuals who are retired – who 
are highly unlikely to re-enter paid work in the future and be concerned about how their 
(potential) wages might be affected by trade.
14
The key results from the estimations are reported in Table 1, which displays the estimated 
effects of education on individual trade preferences in the full NES sample and in each of the 
different sub-samples. To facilitate comparison across sub-samples, rather than showing 
estimated probit coefficients, we report estimated marginal effects: that is, the change in the 
probability of favoring protectionism associated with an infinitesimal change in schooling (for the 
specific dummy variables for levels of highest educational attainment, the discrete change in the 
probability is shown). 
[Table 1] 
Comparing the results across the sub-samples we find little difference in the estimated 
effects of education on attitudes toward trade. In all cases, the estimated effects of schooling are 
very similar, both in terms of magnitude and level of statistical significance, across all models 
(none of the coefficients is significantly different from the others across sub-samples at 
conventional levels). This is true for estimations using both the 1992 and the 1996 NES data. For 
example, in the case of the 1996 survey, using the extensive set of covariates, a change from zero 
                                                      
14 While pensions for retired workers in some prominent U.S. industries (e.g., steel) have been linked to the 
financial health of their former employers, this is the exception and not the rule. Recent studies of U.S. 
retirees indicate that less than 17% of retirement income in the median household comes from employer-
provided pension plans (see Sass 2003, 6; Social Security Administration 2002). And the connection 
between employer-provided pensions and the financial health of the firm is attenuated by the standards for 
funding and fiduciary conduct established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 (see 
Sass 1997). On this issue, we might also note that we get identical results when we perform the same tests 
comparing retirees with workers using the ISSP data (see below), drawn from a variety of countries with a 
variety of pension and retirement income systems. 
  13to seventeen years of schooling (while holding the other covariates at their respective sample 
means) is associated with an average decrease in the probability of favoring protection of about 
0.59 (s.e. 0.05) for the full sample, 0.51 (s.e. 0.09) for those currently in paid work, 0.48 (s.e. 
0.11) for those currently not in paid work, and 0.53 (s.e. 0.11) for those who are retired (models 
9-12, panel B).
15 The observed relationship between education and trade preferences becomes 
even more similar across sub-samples once we replace the schooling measure with the separate 
education dummies. For example, compared to individuals with less than junior-high level 
educations, completing a college education decreases the probability of being in favor of 
protection by about 0.28 (s.e. 0.08) for the full sample, by 0.27 (s.e. 0.11) for those currently in 
paid work, by 0.31 (s.e. 0.13) for those not in paid work, and by 0.37 (s.e. 0.16) for retirees (see 
models 13-16, panel B).
16  
Overall, these results clearly indicate that the link between education and trade 
preferences reflects a causal mechanism that is not associated with concerns about the labor 
market and relative wage rates. The findings here are consistent with both types of alternative 
interpretations, however, suggesting that more educated individuals favor free trade because they 
are more likely to understand the economic case for trade openness and/or because they possess 
more cosmopolitan (or less xenophobic) outlooks – since there is no reason to believe that the 
effects of education on the economic knowledge or cultural values possessed by different 
individuals is conditional at all upon whether or not they are currently in the workforce.  
These alternative interpretations are also supported by the clear nonlinearities that are 
apparent in the relationship between education and views about trade. Once we relax the linearity 
                                                      
15 Predicted effects here, and below, are calculated using the “Clarify” software developed by King, Tomz, 
and Wittenberg (2001). For each such calculation, all other covariates are set at the sample mean values.  
16 Note that since we show marginal effects, the magnitudes of the effects of the dichotomous education 
variables can be read directly from the table.  
  14restriction imposed by simply counting years of education (the schooling measure) we can see 
that the effects of education on trade preferences are described by a non-linear step function: 
college education has by far the greatest negative impact on support for protection, about three 
times larger than higher education (which is not itself a robust predictor), and about 6 times 
bigger than high school education (which is also not itself a robustly significant predictor and 
seems to have, if anything, a positive effect on support for protection) or completion of junior 
high education (which also enters mostly insignificant and with alternate signs); the impact of 
graduate education is almost identical to the effects of college education. For instance, looking 
again at the estimates in the 1996 NES (full sample), and the limited set of covariates, compared 
with individuals with less than a junior high education, completing college education reduces the 
probability of supporting protection by 0.31 (s.e. 0.08), compared to only 0.04 (s.e. 0.09) for 
higher education; finishing high school education raises the probability of support for protection 
by 0.04 (s.e. 0.08) and so does completing junior high grades by 0.11 (s.e. 0.14), though all three 
latter effects are not statistically significant. Meanwhile, completing graduate education reduces 
the probability of protectionist views by 0.35 (s.e. 0.08), an effect not significantly different from 
that associated with completing an undergraduate college education (see model 13, panel A). 
There appears to be a very clear “plateau” effect here, with exposure to college education 
being the critical contributor to the generally positive relationship between education and support 
for free trade. This college plateau effect seems out of place with the story about labor market 
competition and its effects on trade preferences, especially since it applies to retirees as much as 
to those individuals currently active in the job market. On the other hand, this pattern fits much 
better with alternative approaches to explaining attitudes toward trade and the foreign affairs that 
focus on competing ideational and cultural perspectives and the way education – but especially 
college education – teaches students to think about trade and globalization in different ways or to 
evaluate it by different standards. 
  B. Tests Using the ISSP Data 
  15Our second dataset is the 1995 National Identity module of the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP), the main data examined by Mayda and Rodrik (2005) in their recent 
study of the determinants of individual trade preferences. The ISSP collects cross-national data by 
coordinating and combining national surveys on a variety of topics: the 1995 module posed a 
variety of questions about national identity, patriotism, attachments to local communities, feelings 
about foreigners, and attitudes towards foreign trade and immigration.
17 It provides information 
on some 28,500 respondents from 23 countries, including the United States, Canada, Japan, many 
Western and Eastern European countries, and one developing country (the Philippines).
18  
Our treatment of the ISSP data follows precisely the measurement and estimation 
strategies employed by Mayda and Rodrik (2005). Accordingly, we measure individual trade 
policy preferences using respondents’ answers to the following question:
19
Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations between (respondent’s country) 
and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Respondent’s country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its 
national economy. 
Options:   1  Agree strongly 
                                                      
17 For details, see ISSP 1995. See also: http://www.issp.org/ 
18 The specific countries are West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, United States, Austria, Hungary, 
Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Philippines, Japan, Spain, Latvia, and Slovak Republic. 
19 See Mayda and Rodrik (2005, 1401) for a discussion of the potential problems associated with the 
question wording.  
  162  Agree 
3  Neither agree nor disagree 
4  Disagree 
5  Disagree strongly 
8  Can’t choose, don’t know 
9  NA, refused 
Following Mayda and Rodrik, we created two binary variables, labeled Pro-Trade-Dummy and 
Against-Trade-Dummy, based upon responses to this question. Pro-Trade-Dummy is coded 1 for 
individuals opposing trade protection (i.e. for those replying “disagree” or “disagree strongly” to 
the question), and zero otherwise. Against-Trade-Dummy is coded 1 for individuals favoring trade 
protection (i.e. for those replying “agree” or “agree strongly” to the question), and zero otherwise. 
Accordingly, the “Can’t choose, don’t know” and “NA, refused” responses are coded as zero. 
Since the results from the estimations of the Pro-Trade-Dummy and Against-Trade-Dummy are 
substantively very similar, we just emulate Mayda and Rodrik here and present only the results 
using the analysis of the Pro-Trade-Dummy.
20
Once again the principal measure of education, schooling, is simply a count of the years 
of full-time education completed by each respondent (we follow Mayda and Rodrik and set a cap 
at 20 years). In order to test for nonlinearities in the effects of education on attitudes, we again 
construct a set of highest educational attainment dummy variables which include secondary 
incomplete (1=some secondary education; 0 otherwise), high school  (1=high school degree; 
0=otherwise), and college (1=university education; 0=otherwise). The reference category here 
comprises those respondents who have only a primary school education (or less). Unlike the NES 
                                                      
20 Mayda and Rodrik note that their results are also unchanged if they treated “Can’t choose, don’t know” 
and “NA, refused” as missing data, and the same is true for our findings. In addition, Mayda and Rodrik 
report that they also used a categorical dependent variable (labeled TRADE_OP) to estimate ordered logit 
(and OLS regression) models and obtained “very similar” substantive results (2005, 1397). 
  17data, the ISSP does not allow us to distinguish any finer categories here; no separate coding for 
graduate education is available, so the college category here includes respondents with advanced 
or higher university degrees (and those who attended college but did not complete a degree).  
Our estimation strategy is identical to that one we applied for the analysis of the NES 
data. We estimate two series of binary probit models in which the Pro-Trade Dummy is estimated 
using either schooling or the set of education dummy variables and other covariates. We 
estimated all the models for all sub-samples using three sets of controls. Our limited set of 
controls includes just age, gender, and citizenship and a full set of country dummies. This mirrors 
precisely the baseline specification as presented in Mayda and Rodrik (2005, p. 1403, Table 4, 
column 1). Our extensive set of controls matches those included in their “demographic model” 
(Table 4, column 2) and includes age, gender, citizenship, area of residence (i.e., rural, suburban, 
or urban residence), subjective social class, political party affiliation, trade union membership, 
the log of real income and a full set of country dummies.
21 Our third model mirrors Mayda and 
Rodrik’s “factor endowments model” (their Table 4, column 3). It includes the covariates age, 
gender, citizenship, and a full set of country dummies, as well as a schooling*gdp multiplicative 
term that interacts the schooling measure with the log of GDP per capita in the respondent’s 
country alongside the main effect of schooling.
22 The idea here is to capture potential cross-
country heterogeneity with respect to the education effect. GDP per capita is used here as a 
simple indicator of relative factor abundance; the assumption is that higher levels of GDP per 
                                                      
21 Following Mayda and Rodrik (2005) we compute real income using data in local currency from the ISSP 
dataset and purchasing power parity conversion factors taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. See http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/ 
22 GDP per capita data is taken from the WDI (1995 current international dollars, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity). Note that the direct effect of country GDP per capita on the attitudes of respondents is 
captured by the country dummies and is not estimated separately. See Mayda and Rodrik (2005, 1405) for a 
detailed discussion of the specification. 
  18capita are associated with a greater abundance of skilled labor. According to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, skilled individuals will gain in terms of real wages, and thus should be likely 
to favor trade openness, in countries that are abundantly endowed with skilled labor, but the size 
of those gains should be proportional to the degree of skill abundance in each country (and, of 
course, in countries that are actually poorly endowed with skilled labor relative to potential 
trading partners, those gains may become losses). In terms of the anticipated results this means 
that the schooling*gdp interaction term should be positive. In every model we calculate robust 
standard errors allowing for potential within-country clustering. (See the appendix for 
descriptions of all variables and summary statistics). 
Again we created sub-samples of the full ISSP survey sample, separating those who were 
in paid work from those not in paid work. Since the ISSP variable coding the employment status 
of respondents also differentiates between those in full and part-time employment, we define 
those in (and not in) paid work using both possible combinations (just those in full-time work or 
all those working).
23 And again, we have estimated the models separately for those individuals 
who are retired. We estimated all models for the full sample first, and then for each particular 
sub-sample. The results are reported in Table 2, which displays just the estimated marginal effects 
of education on trade preferences. 
[Table 2] 
                                                      
23 The sub-samples are determined by answers to a question asking respondents about their current 
employment status. Answer choices included: full-time employed, part-time employed, less than part-time 
employed, helping family member, unemployed, student, homemaker, retired, permanently disabled, and 
other. Our currently-in(not-in)-paid-work sub-sample includes all those (not) answering “employed (either 
part-time or full time)” to this question. Those with missing employment status are coded as missing. We 
also re-estimated all models including those working “less than part-time” in the currently-in-paid-work 
sub-samples. The results are substantively identical to those in Table 2 (and are available upon request). 
  19Overall, the findings from the analysis of the ISSP data are very similar to the results 
from the analysis of the NES data reported above. Here the estimated effects of schooling on 
attitudes towards trade are almost identical, both in terms of magnitude and level of statistical 
significance, across all sub-samples, and regardless of whether we examine the baseline (panel 
A), the demographic (panel B), or the factor endowment models (panel C). None of the schooling 
effects are significantly different from others across the sub-samples at conventional levels. For 
example, in the baseline model, a shift from zero to twenty years of schooling (while holding the 
other covariates at their respective sample means) increases the probability of favoring trade by 
about 0.34 (s.e. 0.05) in the full sample, by 0.37 (s.e. 0.06) in the in (full-time) work sub-sample, 
by 0.31 (s.e. 0.05) for the not-in-full-time-work sub-sample, and by 0.33 (s.e. 0.05) in the retired 
sub-sample (models 1-6, panel A). These estimated effects of education are very similar 
regardless of whether those working on a part-time basis are included in the “paid work” sub-
sample or not. The same holds true if we account for potential cross-country heterogeneity with 
respect to the education effect (panel C). Both the direct effect of schooling and its interaction 
with GDP per capita are almost identical across sub-samples. The similarity in these effects 
across the different sub-samples of respondents is again clearly at odds with the claim that the 
schooling coefficients are primarily indicative of concerns among respondents about the effects of 
trade openness on labor markets and relative wages.  
If we relax the linearity restriction and replace the schooling measure with the education 
dummy variables, it is clear that the impact of the education on trade preferences remains very 
similar across the sub-samples. It also becomes apparent again that the effects of education on 
opinions about trade are non-linear. Specifically, college education has by far the greatest positive 
effect on individual-level support for free trade, two-to-three times bigger than the impact of high 
school education (which is not a robustly significant predictor of attitudes); meanwhile, 
incomplete secondary education appears to have little if any effect on support for free trade (only 
very few of the coefficients enter significant at conventional levels and some even switch signs). 
  20For instance, in the demographic model (model 7, panel B), and comparing with individuals with 
only primary level education, college education shifts the probability of being pro-trade by 0.14 
(s.e. 0.04) as compared to only 0.06 (s.e. 0.04) for completing high school education; and 
incomplete secondary education increases the probability of being pro-free trade by a mere 0.02 
(s.e. 0.04) – the latter two effects are insignificant at conventional levels. The same non-linearities 
are clear when cross-country heterogeneity in the education effect is taken into account. For 
example, for the full sample in the factor endowments model (model 7, panel C), evaluated at the 
sample mean level of GDP per capita among the ISSP nations ($15,987), a college education 
raises the probability of being pro-trade by 0.18 (s.e. 0.01) compared to a primary level 
education; the corresponding effect is only 0.09 (s.e. 0.01) for completing high school education, 
and an incomplete secondary education increases the probability of being pro-free trade by a mere 
0.04 (s.e. 0.01). The pattern here strongly resembles the college “plateau” effect found in the 
analysis of the NES data, and again confirms – this time based upon data drawn from surveyed 23 
nations – that exposure to college education among individuals lies at the heart of the observable 
relationship between education and support for free trade. Regardless of which model we 
estimate, the college effect is strikingly similar across all sub-samples.  
One issue we need to address here concerns the cross-country heterogeneity with respect 
to the education effect that is evident in the results from the estimations of factor endowments 
model. As reported by Mayda and Rodrik, we find that the schooling*gdp interaction term is 
positive – in all of the sub-samples. The implication is that the impact of education on individual 
attitudes toward trade varies by country depending on levels of economic development. For 
example, examining the full-sample estimates (model 1, panel C), a shift from zero to twenty 
years of schooling (other covariates at their respective sample means) increases the probability of 
favoring trade openness by about 0.49 (s.e. 0.03) in a country with GDP per capita of $22,039 
(i.e., Germany in 1995) but by only 0.27 (s.e. 0.02) in a country with GDP per capita of $11,720 
(the Czech Republic in 1995).  
  21This result is consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it also seems very 
consistent with the alternative ideational and cultural accounts of the causal effects of education 
on attitudes toward trade (accounts that can also explain the similarity in the effects of education 
across labor-market sub-samples in each country). In line with an ideational approach, it seems 
highly likely that there are important cross-national differences in the content and quality of 
instruction in economics at the college level that are related to cross-national differences in levels 
of development across these surveyed countries. Economists and other scholars in less developed 
countries may be more concerned than their counterparts in wealthier nations about the 
adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization, or the fairness of trade negotiations and 
agreements, and convey these concerns to students. Or, more in line with a cultural account that 
stresses the link between education and values, it also seems very plausible that education 
systems in richer ISSP nations, which have longer histories of democratic institutions than poorer 
nations, may place greater emphasis on inculcating tolerance among students, and thus may more 
effectively discourage anti-foreigner (and protectionist) sentiments. The general point here is that 
there are plausible explanations for the observed differences between richer and poorer ISSP 
countries in the effects of education on attitudes toward trade that fit with the ideational and 
cultural accounts; the similarities in the effects of education across sub-samples of individuals 
within each country, and the college plateau effect, are also consistent with these same accounts, 
but they contradict the Stolper-Samuelson view.
24
                                                      
24 In general we do not place great importance on the finding that the schooling*gdp interaction term is 
positive for the ISSP set of countries – in our analysis of the alternative Pew data on individual trade 
preferences, which includes a much larger and more varied set of countries (see discussion below), we do 
not find the same, simple positive relationship between GDP per capita and the magnitude of the education 
effect. The breakdown of this relationship among countries with more varied political and institutional 
histories suggests that it does not provide firm support for a Stolper-Samuelson interpretation. These results 
are available at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/HainmuellerHiscox_IOa.html 
  22  C. Family Income Effects? 
It seems impossible to square the findings we have reported above with a simple Stolper-
Samuelson reading of the effects of education on trade policy preferences. One possible counter-
argument, in defense of the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation, is that individuals who themselves 
are not employed or seeking employment are nevertheless concerned about the distributional 
effects of trade because it will have an impact on their total family or household income. Thus, 
individuals who are not employed and describe themselves as “homemakers” may actually be 
making calculations about the effects of trade on the earnings of their spouse or partner when 
responding to survey questions. Similarly, retired individuals may be taking into account the 
effects of trade on the earnings of their children. If these are powerful concerns, and if there is a 
strong and positive within-family correlation in levels of education, expectations about within-
family income transfers might feasibly explain the results we are reporting here in a way that 
would still be broadly consistent with the spirit of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. To the best of 
our knowledge, this family income extension of the theorem has not actually been advanced or 
tested before – no such claims are made by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b) or Mayda and 
Rodrik (2005). On the face of it, we think this potential explanation seems quite implausible, 
given the clear similarities between the education effects across sub-samples, the imperfect 
correlation between individual education attainment and spouses’ or partners’ (or children’s) 
education levels, and the uncertainty attached to within-family income transfers. The connection 
between retirees’ incomes and the earnings of their children seems especially tenuous, since most 
retirees in western countries rely overwhelmingly upon personal savings, retirement accounts, 
and state-provided pensions for their retirement income. 
  23We tested the alternative explanation using the NES data, which provide the best 
available data on individual marital status.
25 The NES includes the following question: “Are you 
married now and living with your (husband/wife) – or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or 
have you never married?” Following the NES recommendations, we created a dummy variable 
partner, coded 1 if the respondent indicated he or she is currently living with a spouse or partner 
and 0 otherwise. To provide an explicit test of spouse and partner effects, we simply repeated all 
our split-sample analysis using the partner variable to further divide each labor market sub-
sample according to marital status.
26 Dividing the sample in one more dimension results in a 
limited number of observations within each sub-sample, of course, so we estimate the model with 
only the limited set of covariates (including age, gender, and race) here, and we use only the 
1992 NES data (the 1996 NES data contains half the total number of observations of the 1992 
NES sample, as noted above).
27 Results from these estimations are reported in Table 3. Again we 
report estimated marginal effects for the education variables so that magnitudes are directly 
comparable across sub-samples.  
[Table 3] 
                                                      
25 Unfortunately, we cannot conduct a similar analysis for the ISSP survey, because far too much data is 
missing on the marital status of the respondents. We have repeated these tests using the data from the GAP 
survey, however, and have found substantively identical results (findings from these additional tests are 
also available from the authors). 
26 We have also re-run our models for each sub-sample using a multiplicative term (partner*schooling) 
alongside the main effect of partner and the results are very similar to the ones reported below. 
Nonetheless, given the high correlation between the multiplicative and its lower order terms we prefer the 
split-sample tests as our identification strategy. 
27 Note too, that in the specifications that replace the single schooling variable with separate educational 
dummies, we also exclude the junior high attainment dummy, since there are no observations for this 
category in some sub-samples. 
  24The similarities in the effects of education across sub-samples appear again here, 
regardless of whether we limit the analysis to those respondents who have a spouse/partner or to 
those who do not. In all cases the estimated effects of schooling are very similar, both in terms of 
magnitude and level of statistical significance. Most importantly, within and across each sub-
sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the education effects are identical (at the 90% 
percent level). For example, for the full sample estimates, a change from zero to seventeen years 
of schooling (while holding the other covariates at their respective sample means) is associated 
with an average decrease in the probability of favoring protection of about 0.48 (s.e. 0.03) for all 
respondents, 0.50 (s.e. 0.04) for those respondents that have a partner/spouse, and 0.44 (s.e. 0.06) 
for those that do not have a partner/spouse. Looking only at those that are currently in paid work, 
the respective decrease is 0.50 (s.e. 0.04) for all respondents, 0.51 (s.e. 0.05) for those that have a 
partner/spouse, and 0.47 (s.e. 0.08) for those that do not. And for those respondents that are out of 
the workforce, the respective decrease is 0.35 (s.e. 0.07) for all, 0.38 (s.e. 0.09) for with a partner, 
and 0.35 (s.e. 0.11) for those without. Finally, for the retired sub-sample, the respective decrease 
is again very similar, about 0.32 (s.e. 0.11) for all, 0.33 (s.e. 0.14) for those with and 0.33 (s.e. 
0.18) for those without a partner/spouse. 
The same results emerge when we re-run the models, replacing the schooling measure 
with the educational attainment dummies. Most importantly, the key college effect remains 
strikingly stable across models even if we divide the sub-samples using the partner variable. For 
example for the full sample, completing college education decreases in the probability of favoring 
protection by about 0.30 (s.e. 0.05) for all respondents, by about 0.30 (s.e. 0.06) for those with 
partner/spouse, and by 0.34 (s.e. 0.08) for those without (all compared to those that did not 
complete a high school degree). For those currently in work, the respective decrease is 0.29 
(s.e.0.07) for all respondents, 0.27 (s.e. 0.08) for those with, and 0.33 (0.14) for those without a 
partner/spouse. For those not working, the respective decrease is 0.32 (s.e. 0.09) for all 
respondents, 0.39 (s.e. 0.13) for those with, and 0.44 (s.e. 0.12) for those without a 
  25partner/spouse. The retired sub-sample reveals the greatest differences in magnitudes of the 
college effect. The decrease in pro-protection attitudes associated with completing college is 0.41 
(s.e. 0.12) for all respondents, 0.28 (s.e. 0.17) for those with, and 0.66 (s.e. 0.10) without a 
partner. This difference is, if anything, the opposite of what one would expect if one simply 
assumed that retirees with partners were assessing the effects of trade on the incomes of their 
(working and similarly educated) partners while retirees without partners were not.  
If we just compare the effects of college (or schooling) across sub-samples of respondents 
that do not have partners – a test that presumably excludes the bulk of any family income effects 
– it is clear that these effects are not significantly different, regardless of whether those 
respondents are working, not working, or retired. Certainly the effects are not significantly larger 
for those being paid for the employment of their skills than for others, as implied by a simple 
Stolper-Samuelson interpretation of the impact of education. Overall, the findings suggest that a 
broader family or household interpretation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem cannot account for 
the results we have found.  
IV. Findings, Implications, and Future Research 
Previous research has concluded that the simple association that is evident between 
education and support for trade openness among survey respondents in the United States and 
other Western nations is proof positive of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. That is, this 
relationship is seen as a straightforward confirmation that high-skilled individuals in skill-
abundant economies perceive that trade openness raises their real wages while low-skilled 
individuals calculate that their real wages decrease with trade liberalization. But if these 
calculations are paramount, the effects of education on individual trade policy preferences should 
be conditional upon whether or not individuals are actually being paid for the employment of 
their skills in the labor market. Re-examining the available survey data on individual attitudes 
toward international trade in a variety of nations, we find that this is simply not the case. The 
impact of education on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents currently in 
  26the active labor force and among those who are not – and even among those who are retired from 
work. And the impact of education on attitudes is overwhelmingly due to college education. We 
have replicated all the tests we report above using two alternative cross-national survey datasets – 
the third wave of the World Values Survey carried out in 1995-1997, and the Global Attitudes 
Project survey administered by Pew in 2003 – and we have found substantively identical 
results.
28  
Given these results, a fundamental reinterpretation of the survey evidence on attitudes 
toward trade and globalization appears to be in order. The results reported above indicate that the 
effects of education levels on trade policy preferences are not primarily a reflection of 
distributional concerns among survey respondents. We suggest instead that the impact of 
education on how individuals think about trade and globalization has more to do with ideas and 
information about the aggregate effects of these economic phenomena. Some part of the effect of 
education on attitudes toward trade might also reflect the fact that college-educated individuals 
are less likely than others to harbor anti-foreigner sentiments. Which of these two causal 
mechanisms – ideational or cultural – is more important? Unfortunately, no opinion surveys (of 
which we are aware) gather all the data that one would need to answer this question definitively. 
That is, no surveys ask respondents about their views regarding trade, also ask questions designed 
to measure economic knowledge or exposure to economic ideas, and also ask questions that 
would gauge individuals’ commitments to values such as tolerance and cosmopolitanism. For 
now we only have some clues provided by studies of partial sets of data – but these clues suggest 
to us that the smart betting would be on the ideational argument. 
One major clue comes from the available data on economic knowledge among the public 
and its impact upon trade policy preferences. As far as we are aware, the only survey that has 
                                                      
28 Full results from all these separate tests are available in a supplement to this paper that can be 
downloaded at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/HainmuellerHiscox_IOa.html 
  27actually combined measures of both economic knowledge and attitudes toward trade is the 1992 
poll conducted by William Walstad and Max Larsen for the National Center for Research on 
Economics Education and for Gallup (see Walstad 1997; Walstad and Rebeck 2002). To gauge 
“economic literacy” – the main purpose of the study – the survey asked respondents a battery of 
substantive economic knowledge questions. What is especially interesting, in light of the 
discussion above, is that once this measure of specialized economic knowledge is included in 
estimations of individual support for trade openness, the effects of the standard measures of 
education on attitudes toward trade shrink dramatically in magnitude and none of these effects 
remains statistically significant (see Walstad 1997, 201. That is, economic literacy appears to 
account for most of the “raw” impact of education on attitudes about trade.
29 And this literacy 
effect is very stable across various sub-samples of respondents who are in the active labor force 
and those who are not. 
On the other side of this coin, adding various measures of individuals’ commitments to 
various relevant cultural values (like tolerance and cosmopolitanism) to estimations of attitudes 
toward trade appears to have almost no affect at all on the magnitude or significance of the effects 
of standard measures of education. For instance, using the ISSP survey data that asked a large 
number of “identity” questions, Mayda and Rodrik (2005, 1414---6) introduced an array of 
controls for (self-expressed) national pride and attachment to local their communities when 
estimating individual support for trade protection. Many of these cultural variables had significant 
and sizeable effects on trade preferences, but they had no significant effect at all on the estimated 
effects of education on such preferences. Using a variety of different measures of racial and 
cultural tolerance available in the 1992 NES survey, we have found very similar results – that is, 
while the various measures of tolerance among the respondents are themselves significant 
                                                      
29 Full results from our own tests using the Walstad and Larsen data are available online at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/HainmuellerHiscox_IOa.html 
  28predictors of views about trade, they account for none of the raw impact of education on trade 
policy preferences.
30
Finally, it is important to note that while these results indicate that the impact of 
education on trade preferences has more to do with ideas and economic literacy than it does with 
calculations about how trade affects personal income or job security, this is not to say that the 
latter types of calculations are not important in shaping individuals views of trade. Our 
conclusion here is just that the simple association between education and support for free trade 
among surveyed individuals is not a clear manifestation of such distributional concerns. We 
strongly suspect that concerns about the effects of trade on personal economic well being income 
and security do play a large role in shaping trade policy preferences, but they are related much 
more directly to the impact that trade openness is expected to have in particular industries and 
firms. “Specific factors” models of the distributional effects of trade that, unlike the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, allow that factors of production are not perfectly mobile between different 
sectors in the economy, predict that the real incomes of individuals are tied closely to the fortunes 
of the particular industries in which they are employed or invested (see Jones 1971; Mussa 
1974).
31 To date, studies of individual trade preferences have indicated only weak (Mayda and 
Rodrik) or no (Scheve and Slaughter) support for the prediction that individuals employed in 
import-competing industries will be much less likely to support trade openness than those 
employed in exporting industries. But these studies have measured the industry-specific effects of 
trade in a very indirect way, locating respondents by industry using answers to a standard 
question about the type of business in which they are employed, then controlling for the aggregate 
                                                      
30 Results from all these separate tests are available from the authors and can also be downloaded at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/HainmuellerHiscox_IOa.html 
31 The specific factors approach underpins much of the most recent analysis of the political economy of 
trade in contemporary advanced economies: see Magee 1980; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Hiscox 2002. 
  29trade positions of those industries (e.g., their degrees of import penetration) when estimating 
individual trade preferences.
32 There are at least two major problems with this approach: first, 
accurately coding respondents by industry of employment using standard industrial classifications 
is extremely difficult, as respondents typically give very vague answers to questions about the 
type of business in which they work;
33 second, aggregate industry measures of import penetration 
and export dependence may offer more information about policy outcomes than policy 
preferences and they obscure the obvious variation in positions taken by firms in the sub-
categories within each broad industry grouping.
34  
One of the implications of our findings is that future survey-based measurements need to 
be substantially refined to better account for industry-specific effects if we are to accurately 
gauge the impact of distributional concerns on attitudes towards trade and globalization.
35 
                                                      
32 Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b) examine industry effects using this approach and industry coding 
supplied in the NES. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) were forced to take an extra step: since the ISSP data does 
not provide coding by industry, they inferred industry of employment from occupational codes assigned to 
respondents instead. 
33 When the staff at the Panel Study of Income Dynamics checked a random sample of surveys, for 
instance, they found that industry codes differed across coders in 14% of cases (see PSID 1999). 
34 The standard concern about using import penetration as a measure of an industry’s trade policy 
preference is that low levels of penetration may reflect the effectiveness of a very protectionist lobby (not 
the absence of concerns about import competition).  
35 One recent study, for instance, questioned respondents directly about the likely impact of trade on the 
security of their own particular job, asking them whether they felt that increasing trade made their own job 
more secure, less secure, or had no clear effect (see Hiscox 2004). The estimated probability of support for 
trade was some 45% higher among respondents for whom trade had raised job security compared with 
those reporting that trade made their own job less secure.  
  30Resolving these issues is crucial for improving our understanding of the determinants of anti-
globalization sentiments and the range of policies that might address them.  
  31 
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Table 1: The Effect of Education on Trade Preferences across Sub-Samples – NES Data 
Survey  NES 1992  NES 1996 
DV  Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism; 0=Otherwise)  Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism; 0=Otherwise) 
Mean DV  0.67  0.52 
SD DV  0.46  0.49 


































1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
       PANEL A: Limited Set of Covariates
2
Schooling  -0.048***  -0.056***  -0.031***  -0.028**       -0.058*** -0.058***  -0.044*** -0.044**      
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011)      (0.010)  (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)      
Junior  High       -0.024  0.028  -0.056  -0.029       0.108  0.073  0.118  0.204** 
       (0.087)  (0.154)  (0.100)  (0.131)       (0.139) (0.218) (0.134) (0.103) 
High  School       0.028  0.051  0.016  0.070       0.036  0.007  0.065  0.042 
       (0.047)  (0.070)  (0.058)  (0.091)       (0.083) (0.128) (0.095) (0.110) 
Higher  Education       -0.109**  -0.113  -0.079  -0.072       -0.035  -0.022  -0.079  -0.068 
       (0.051)  (0.074)  (0.068)  (0.122)       (0.085) (0.127) (0.109) (0.138) 
College       -0.317*** -0.289*** -0.355*** -0.398***      -0.307*** -0.282**  -0.353*** -0.372** 
       (0.053)  (0.073)  (0.098)  (0.132)       (0.078) (0.112) (0.119) (0.149) 
Graduate       -0.315*** -0.305*** -0.259**  -0.134       -0.348*** -0.315*** -0.365**  -0.297 
       (0.061)  (0.081)  (0.113)  (0.149)       (0.075) (0.102) (0.163) (0.197) 
Observations 1604  1048  556 227  1563  1021  542 217 843 560 283 167 843 560 283 167 
Log  likelihood  -962.64 -646.24 -308.66 -128.20 -922.08 -621.46 -293.76 -114.85 -533.13 -360.69 -164.87  -89.61  -519.93 -353.56 -158.73 -86.96 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.16 
     PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covariates
3
Schooling  -0.049***  -0.057***  -0.032***  -0.025**       -0.057*** -0.054***  -0.047*** -0.056***     
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012)      (0.010)  (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)      
Junior  High       -0.026  0.010  -0.076  -0.003       0.096  -0.017  0.144  0.196* 
       (0.098)  (0.165)  (0.122)  (0.131)       (0.152) (0.237) (0.128) (0.103) 
High  School       0.041  0.072  0.028  0.099       0.046  -0.007  0.083  0.031 
       (0.050)  (0.078)  (0.062)  (0.092)       (0.086) (0.128) (0.099) (0.117) 
Higher  Education       -0.097*  -0.098  -0.057  -0.070       -0.015  -0.033  -0.034  -0.068 
       (0.055)  (0.083)  (0.069)  (0.124)       (0.089) (0.128) (0.114) (0.145) 
College       -0.298*** -0.260*** -0.342*** -0.347**       -0.276*** -0.273**  -0.307**  -0.367** 
       (0.058)  (0.083)  (0.103)  (0.142)       (0.083) (0.113) (0.131) (0.161) 
Graduate       -0.301*** -0.286*** -0.234**  -0.071       -0.329*** -0.316*** -0.303*  -0.261 
       (0.065)  (0.090)  (0.115)  (0.146)       (0.080) (0.103) (0.182) (0.214) 
Observations 1501  989 512 213  1463  964 499 203 815 537 278 166 815 537 278 166 
Log  likelihood  -892.72 -604.92 -277.42 -117.09 -856.56 -581.61 -264.24 -104.87 -508.42 -341.85 -158.43  -85.46  -498.29 -335.93 -154.19 -85.23 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.17 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1), given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors 
at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of 
controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective NES sample weight (v923008 or v960003). 
2. Limited set of covariates includes age, gender, and race. 
3. Extensive set of covariates includes age, gender, race, union membership, party identification, and ideology. For details of variables see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a/b.   38
Table 2: The Effect of Education on Trade Preferences across Sub-samples – ISSP Data 
 
Survey  ISSP 1995 
DV  Pro-Trade-Dummy (1= Pro-Trade; 0 otherwise) 
Mean DV  0.22 
































Model  No.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
         PANEL A: Baseline Specification
2
Schooling 0.017***  0.019***  0.014*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.016***       
 (0.004)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)        
Secondary  Incomplete         0.035  -0.003  0.061***  0.008  0.056*** 0.073***
         (0.026)  (0.042)  (0.018) (0.041) (0.017) (0.021) 
High  School         0.091**  0.076  0.090***  0.085*  0.082*** 0.120***
         (0.036)  (0.051)  (0.028) (0.049) (0.028) (0.021) 
College         0.186*** 0.167*** 0.183***  0.181***  0.165*** 0.192***
         (0.045)  (0.058)  (0.038) (0.056) (0.041) (0.033) 
Observations  26485 12205 13915 14279 11841  4932  28714 12997 15324 15182 13139  5445 
Log  likelihood  -12632.58  -6366.44 -6087.04 -7396.50 -5070.04 -1882.22 -13617.95 -6730.05 -6691.31 -7806.00 -5628.82 -1998.99
Pseudo  R-squared  0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.10 
         PANEL B: The Demographic Model
3
Schooling 0.015***  0.013***  0.015*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.020***       
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)        
Secondary  Incomplete         0.019  -0.023  0.070  0.008  0.041  0.018 
         (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.044) (0.052) (0.029) (0.041) 
High  School         0.064  0.022  0.101***  0.035  0.115*** 0.087***
         (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.034) (0.055) (0.026) (0.031) 
College         0.137*** 0.089*  0.185***  0.108*  0.187*** 0.162** 
         (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.044) (0.055) (0.045) (0.078) 
Observations  5809 3785 1934 4427 1290  503  6547 4138 2313 4834 1615  688 
Log  likelihood  -2805.44  -1946.62 -815.17 -2241.61 -521.34  -185.57 -3123.02 -2102.24 -968.15 -2421.76 -651.50  -230.39 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.15 
          PANEL C: The Factor Endowments Model
4
Schooling  -0.113***  -0.121***  -0.106*** -0.117*** -0.107*** -0.121***       
 (0.021)  (0.019) (0.025) (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.025)        
Ln(GDP)*Schooling  0.014***  0.015***  0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014***       
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)        
Secondary  Incomplete         -0.360*** -0.503*** -0.223***  -0.502***  -0.222*** -0.193**
         (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.079) (0.046) (0.071) (0.081) 
Ln(GDP)*Sec.  Incomplete         0.072*** 0.110*** 0.040**  0.111***  0.040**  0.040* 
         (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) 
High  School         -0.497*** -0.624*** -0.393***  -0.623***  -0.383*** -0.275***
         (0.115)  (0.079)  (0.133) (0.084) (0.122) (0.103) 
Ln(GDP)*High  School         0.095*** 0.116*** 0.077**  0.116***  0.077*** 0.075** 
         (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.031) (0.022) (0.029) (0.033) 
College         -0.551*** -0.710*** -0.425***  -0.705***  -0.398*** -0.322***
         (0.093)  (0.064)  (0.112) (0.071) (0.094) (0.064) 
Ln(GDP)*College        0.144*** 0.164*** 0.132***  0.161***  0.137*** 0.132***
         (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.040) (0.023) (0.038) (0.028) 
Observations  26485 12205 13915 14279 11841  4932  28714 12997 15324 15182 13139  5445 
Log  likelihood  -12543.62  -6325.67 -6042.16 -7353.64 -5027.18 -1861.63 -13526.51 -6683.06 -6647.11 -7754.93 -5584.56 -1981.49
Pseudo  R-squared  0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1), given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other 
regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model 
includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by ISSP sample weight (v342). 
2. Baseline Specification: Covariates includes age, gender, citizenship, and country dummies (this set of covariates is equal to Mayda and Rodrik 2005 Table 4, column 1). 
3. The Demographic Model Specification: Covariates includes age, gender, citizenship, subjective social class, log of real income, rural, union membership, partisan orientation, and country dummies (this 
set of covariates is equal to Mayda and Rodrik 2005 Table 4, column 2). 
4. The Factor Endowment Model Specification: Covariates includes age, gender, citizenship, schooling, a multiplicative term Ln(GDP per capita 1995, PPP)*schooling, and country dummies (this set of 
covariates is equal to Mayda and Rodrik 2005 Table 4, column 3). Note that the country dummies pick up the main effect of Ln(GDP).39
Table 3: The Effect of Education on Trade Preferences across Labor Market and Partner Sub-Samples 
 
Survey  NES 1992 
DV  Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism, 0=Otherwise) 
Mean DV  0.67 
SD DV  0.46 
Sub-sample 1  Full Sample  Currently in Paid-Work  Currently not in Paid-Work  Retired 
Sub-sample 2  All  Partner  No Partner  All  Partner  No Partner  All  Partner  No Partner  All  Partner  No Partner 
Model No.
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
      Panel A: Limited Set of Covariates plus Schooling
2
Schooling  -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.041*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.030***  -0.028**  -0.029*  -0.029* 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Observations  1604  981 623  1048  690 358 556 291 265 227 118 109 
Log  likelihood  -962.64 -575.59 -373.05 -646.24 -425.28 -215.57 -308.66 -149.82 -153.23 -128.20  -61.99  -65.28 
Pseudo  R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05 
       Panel B: Limited Set of Covariates plus Educational Attainment Dummies
2
High  School  0.039 0.099*  -0.104 0.056 0.114 -0.097 0.029 0.083 -0.116 0.067  0.195**  -0.026 
  (0.041) (0.053) (0.071) (0.062) (0.076) (0.137) (0.051) (0.067) (0.088) (0.081) (0.085) (0.131) 
Higher  Education -0.098**  -0.107*  -0.133*  -0.103 -0.089 -0.180 -0.071 -0.107 -0.094 -0.083 -0.022 -0.133 
  (0.045) (0.061) (0.076) (0.066) (0.083) (0.139) (0.061) (0.085) (0.101) (0.113) (0.127) (0.189) 
College  -0.303*** -0.301*** -0.339*** -0.284*** -0.266***  -0.328**  -0.317*** -0.393*** -0.443*** -0.412***  -0.282*  -0.658*** 
  (0.048) (0.064) (0.083) (0.066) (0.082) (0.140) (0.089) (0.128) (0.123) (0.121) (0.165) (0.096) 
Graduate  -0.296*** -0.290*** -0.354*** -0.289*** -0.263*** -0.411***  -0.245**  -0.310**  -0.135  -0.182  -0.150  0.158 
  (0.056) (0.073) (0.099) (0.074) (0.093) (0.138) (0.104) (0.131) (0.231) (0.142) (0.174) (0.174) 
Observations  1672  949 614  1101  666 355 571 280 257 227 112 105 
Log  likelihood  -981.10 -540.78 -367.22 -666.87 -401.24 -213.79 -308.26 -134.77 -146.58 -120.28  -53.10  -53.81 
Pseudo  R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.18 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1), given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample 
means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not 
shown here). Cases weighted by the NES sample weight (v923008). 
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, and race. 
 
 Appendix: Summary Statistics and Variable Descriptions 
 
  Table A.1: Summary Statistics for NES Data 
NES 1992 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Trade_Opinion 1736  0.674 0.464  0  1 
Schooling 2329  12.978  2.733 0  17 
Graduate 2420  0.076  0.264  0  1 
College 2420  0.163  0.369  0  1 
Higher Education  2420  0.242  0.428  0  1 
High School  2420  0.343  0.475  0  1 
Junior High  2329  0.036  0.187  0  1 
Age 2485  44.271  17.210  17  91 
Male 2485  0.477  0.500  0 1 
White 2450  0.845  0.362  0 1 
Black 2450  0.130  0.336  0 1 
Indian 2450  0.012  0.110  0 1 
Asian 2450  0.013  0.114  0 1 
Trade Union Member  2472  0.108  0.310  0  1 
Party ID  2445  2.727  2.022  0  6 
Ideology 2277  0.791  0.938  0  2 
NES 1996 
Trade_Opinion 846  0.524 0.491  0  1 
Schooling 1713  13.432  2.581 0  17 
Graduate 1711  0.099  0.299  0  1 
College 1711  0.186  0.389  0  1 
Higher Education  1711  0.274  0.446  0  1 
High School  1711  0.315  0.465  0  1 
Junior High  1713  0.021  0.143  0  1 
Age 1712  45.529  16.853  18  93 
Male 1714  0.479  0.500  0 1 
White 1704  0.852  0.355  0 1 
Black 1704  0.117  0.322  0 1 
Indian 1704  0.012  0.108  0 1 
Asian 1704  0.019  0.136  0 1 
Trade Union Member  1687  0.120  0.325  0  1 
Party ID  1695  2.735  2.101  0  6 
Ideology 1651  0.759  0.922  0  2 
  Cases weighted by respective NES sample weight (v923008 or v960003). 
 
Table A.2: Variable Descriptions for NES Data 
Variable Coding 
Trade_Opinion 
Pro Free Trade Attitudes: “Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American 
jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new 
limits on imports, or haven’t you thought much about this?“ Coded: 1=Favor New Limits, 0=Oppose. NES variables v923802 
& v961327. 
Schooling  Years of Full Time Education Completed. NES variables v923905 & v960607 
Graduate  Highest Educational Attainment Dummy: Coded 1 if completed Graduate Education and 0 otherwise. NES variables v923908 
& v960610. 
College  Highest Educational Attainment Dummy: Coded 1 if completed College Education and 0 otherwise. NES variables v923908 & 
v960610. 
Higher Education  Highest Educational Attainment Dummy: Coded 1 if completed some higher Education (Community or Junior College, etc. ) 
and 0 otherwise. NES variables v923908 & v960610. 
High School  Highest Educational Attainment Dummy: Coded 1 if completed High School Education and 0 otherwise. NES variables 
v923908 & v960610. 
Junior High  Highest Educational Attainment Dummy: Coded 1 if completed only 8 years of schooling and 0 otherwise. NES variables 
v923905 & v960607. 
Age  Age in years. NES variables v923903 & v960605. 
Male  Gender: Coded 1 if Male and 0 if Female. NES variables v924201 & v960066. 
White  Respondent’s Race: Coded 1 if White and 0 otherwise. NES variables v924202& v960067. 
Black  Respondent’s Race: Coded 1 if Black and 0 otherwise. NES variables v924202& v960067. 
Indian  Respondent’s Race: Coded 1 if Indian and 0 otherwise. NES variables v924202& v960067. 
Asian  Respondent’s Race: Coded 1 if Asian and 0 otherwise. NES variables v924202& v960067. 
Trade Union Member  Is respondent currently a Trade Union Member: Coded 1 if Yes and 0 if No. NES variables v924102/ v924101 & 
v960699/v960698. 
Party ID  Respondent’s Party Identification: Coded from 0 “strong Democrat” to 6 “strong Republican.” NES variables v923634 & 
v960420 
Ideology  Respondent’s Ideology: Coded 0 Conservative; 1 Moderate; 2 Liberal. NES variables v923513 & v960368. 
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics for ISSP Data  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Pro-Trade-Dummy 30894  0.221  0.408  0  1 
Against-Trade-Dummy 30894  0.570  0.495  0  1 
Schooling 28022  11.375  3.713  0  20 
Secondary Incomplete  30294  0.218  0.413  0  1 
High School  30294  0.299  0.458  0  1 
College 30294  0.230  0.421  0  1 
Age 30666  44.355  16.923  14  98 
Male 30778  0.480  0.500  0  1 
Citizen 29440  0.973  0.163  0  1 
Rural 24074  1.730  0.894  1  3 
Party ID  18352  2.905  0.979  1  5 
Trade Union Member  24662  0.302  0.459  0  1 
LN Real Income  21860  9.215  1.700  2.5  13.9 
LN GDP per capita  30894  9.487  0.668  8.1  10.2 




  Table A.4: Variable Descriptions for ISSP Data 
Variable Name  Coding: 
Pro-Trade-Dummy 
Pro Free Trade Attitudes: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Respondent’s country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its 
national economy.” Coded 1 if answered disagree strongly or disagree and 0 otherwise. ISSP 
variable (v38). 
Against-Trade-Dummy  Pro Protectionism Attitudes: Same question as above but coded 1 if answered agree strongly or 
agree and 0 otherwise. 
Schooling  Years of Full Time Education Schooling (cap at 20). Those with no formal schooling are coded 
as 0. ISSP variable (v204) 
Secondary Incomplete  Highest educational attainment: Coded 1 if Incomplete Secondary Education and 0 otherwise. 
ISSP variable (v205) 
High School  Highest educational attainment: Coded 1 if Completed Secondary Education and 0 otherwise. 
ISSP variable (v205) 
College  Highest educational attainment: Coded 1 if had College/University Education or Semi-higher 
degrees and 0 otherwise. ISSP variable (v205) 
Age  Age in years. ISSP variable (v201) 
Male  Gender: Coded 1 if Male and 0 if Female. ISSP variable (v200) 
Citizen  Citizenship: “Are you a citizen of (country)?” Coded 1 if Citizen and 0 otherwise. ISSP variable 
(v63) 
Rural  Area of Residence: Coded 1 if Urban, 2 if Suburban, and 3 if Rural. ISSP variable (v295). 
Party ID  Party Affiliation: Self Placement on a left – right scale. Coded from 1 “Far Left” to 5 “Far 
Right”. ISSP variable (v269). 
Trade Union Member  Trade Union Membership: “Are you a member in a trade union at present?” Coded 1 if 
answered “Member Now” and 0 if answered “Not a Member Now”. ISSP variable (v268) 
LN Real Income  Log of Real Income. Data in local currency converted by PPP conversion factors taken from 
WDI database. ISSP variable (v217). 
LN GDP per capita  Log of GDP per capita 1995, PPP (current international dollars). Taken from WDI database. 
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